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LEGISLATORS LIVIN’ ON A PRAYER: THE FOURTH AND 
SIXTH CIRCUITS’ APPLICATION OF TOWN OF GREECE ON THE 
QUESTION OF LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 
Tori Gooder* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the words of Thomas Jefferson, the Establishment Clause was 
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."1 
While the phrase may be simple, determining what that "wall" should 
look like has been far from a simple task. The Supreme Court has spent 
more than a century debating what that wall looks like between the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Beginning with 
Everson and continuing to Town of Greece, a plethora of tests have 
formed, and yet not one precedential standard to evaluate Establishment 
Clause cases rules.2 In the recent circuit split between the Fourth Circuit 
and Sixth Circuit, the two courts struggle with this complex 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to answer the question whether 
legislators themselves may lead prayer.  
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits emerge with seemingly different 
holdings about the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer, despite 
having extremely similar facts. In Lund v. Rowan City, the Fourth 
Circuit held the County's Board of Commissioners' longtime practice of 
leading prayers themselves violated the Establishment Clause.3 On the 
other hand, in Bormuth v. City of Jackson, the Sixth Circuit found the 
County's Board of Commissioners' tradition of leading prayers 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause.4 Both circuits agree that 
legislator-led prayer is not per se unconstitutional and apply at least the 
surface level law of Marsh and Town of Greece correctly.5 The 
difference in the holdings lies in the Sixth Circuit's mischaracterization 
of Town of Greece's deeper holding: courts must look beyond the 
contents of the prayers and the identity of the prayer-giver and instead 
focus on the motivation and intentions behind the prayer-giver's 
invocations. The Sixth Circuit strategically avoids facts vital to the 
constitutional inquiry of the prayer-giver's motivations by considering 
the prayers in a vacuum and dismissing the relevant facts through a 
 
                *    Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
 2. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811,1819 (2014). 
 3. 863 F.3d 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 4. 870 F.3d 494, 509 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 5. Lund, 863 F.3d at 279; Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509. 
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procedural ruling. 
This article explores the complicated Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and its involvement in the recent circuit split over 
legislator-led prayer. First, this article outlines the evolution of 
Establishment Clause case law, highlighting the ideological movements 
that shift the Supreme Court from strict separationists to 
accommodationists. Next, the article will investigate the doctrinal 
starting point for which Marsh and Town of Greece set the foundation 
for both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits to evaluate legislator-led prayer. 
In light of both Marsh and Town of Greece, the article will then explain 
the analysis and holdings of the Fourth and Sixth Circuit. Finally, the 
article will discuss the circuits’ correct and incorrect holdings and 
application of Town of Greece’s requirement that courts scrutinize the 
motivations and intentions of the prayer-givers or the prayer policies in 
legislative prayer cases. Although the Fourth Circuit correctly applies 
Town of Greece’s true holding, the Sixth Circuit cannot hide its failure 
to investigate the prayer-giver’s motives nor their obvious attempt to 
shield the appellate record from facts that expose the commissioners’ 
prohibited motivations for prayer. The Supreme Court will most surely 
see through the façade of applying the surface level of Marsh and Town 
of Greece’s precedence. Unfortunately, until then, the lower courts are 
left with a circuit split based on a procedural hoax and feigned 
dissidence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is littered 
with a myriad of tests, plurality opinions, and seemingly contradictory 
holdings. Much of the confusion can be attributed to the tension that 
exists between two fundamental First Amendment rights: the right 
protecting citizens from the establishment of a government endorsed 
religion and the right to have freedom of religion.6 These almost 
paradoxical clauses of the First Amendment have led to years of 
controversy over prayer, Christmas decorations, and government 
funding to private schools. For purposes of this article, the evolution of 
Establishment Clause case law will set up a framework to understand 
the foundation of the recent circuit split on whether legislator-led prayer 
is constitutional. In addition, the review of Marsh and Town of Greece 
will lay the foundation from which the circuits begin their analysis. 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss4/7
2018]  TOWN OF GREECE AND LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER 1355 
A. The Evolution of Establishment Clause Tests: Shifting Ideologies 
The evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence appears 
nonsensical. However, the underlying ideological camps of the justices 
throughout the century, exposes the shifts between Establishment Clause 
tests. Establishment Clause cases fall into one of three categories based 
on the ideological undertones of the Supreme Court Justices of the time. 
The Supreme Court, under Justice Burger, for years held a strict 
separationist view and continued to build a high and impregnable wall 
of separation between church and state.7 Then the era of the Reagan-
appointed Justices shifted the Court a little more “right” to the age of 
neutrality and endorsement.8 During this time, the court transitioned 
from the separationist viewpoint that no aid, no relationship, and no 
commingling between church and state may exist to a more flexible 
approach that substantial aid or substantial commingling may exist 
between church and state, as long as it is neutral and does not endorse a 
particular religion. Later, the Supreme Court relaxed their Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence further holding that the state and the church may 
be substantially intertwined provided that citizens do not feel coerced by 
the state.  
1. The Time of Strict Separationists: The Birth of the Lemon Test 
In 1947, Everson v. Bd. of Education commenced the Supreme 
Court’s separationist Supreme Court era. The Supreme Court narrowly 
upheld a municipal community's decision to subsidize public 
transportation to and from parochial schools, but it unanimously held a 
staunch position that church and state should be completely and 
uncompromisingly separate.9  
Engel v. Vitale echoed Everson's strict separationist viewpoint.10 In 
Engel, the Supreme Court held that “it is no part of the business of the 
government to compose official prayers,” and therefore, students 
reciting prayers every day before school is an “indirect coercive pressure 
upon religious minorities” in violation of the Establishment Clause.11 
Before 1971, the Supreme Court had a "consistency in the way the 
Justices went about deciding the case... Neither side rested on any facile 
application of the 'test' or any simplistic reliance on the generality or 
 
 7. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994). 
 8. Id. at 233. 
 9. Id.; see generally Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 1 (1947) (upholding the statute to 
protect the rights of religious-school students under the Free Exercise Clause). 
 10. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-431 (1962). 
 11. Id. at 425, 431 (explaining that public schools forcing students to recite prayers every day 
before school is in violation of the Establishment Clause). 
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evenhandedness of the state law."12 
In 1971, Lemon v. Kurtzman developed a three part test to apply to 
Establishment Clause cases: (1) the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose, (2) the primary effect of the statute must not be to 
advance nor inhibit a particular religion, and (3) the statute must not 
enable excessive government entanglement with religion.13 The 
Supreme Court in Lemon also seemed to create a fourth factor in the 
Establishment Clause analysis: the effect of the statute on political 
divisiveness.14 The Lemon Test marks the start of the Burger Court's 
effort to be less doctrinal about the separation of church and state, and 
more concerned about the effects the statute has.15 In other words, if the 
effects of the statute are not neutral, but instead endorse a particular 
religion, then, and only then, will the statute be in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 
While the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente completely ignored the 
Lemon Test, the Court focused again on the effect of the statute, and 
whether the statute endorsed or preferred a specific religion.16 The 
Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and held that “[t]he clearest 
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious 
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”17  
In 1983, Marsh v. Chambers followed suit, and also did not apply the 
Lemon Test, but instead carved out an exception to the Establishment 
Clause for legislative prayer cases.18 The Supreme Court held that in 
legislative prayer cases the Lemon Test should not apply, but instead 
courts should interpret the Establishment Clause in light of the historical 
and traditional practices of legislative prayer.19  
2. The Neutrality and Endorsement Era: The Reagan Justices’ 
Revolution 
Marsh was decided on the cusp of the Reagan Justices–Justice Scalia, 
O'Connor, and Kennedy—and clearly repudiated the years of 
separationists structure by carving out an exception within 
 
 12. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 876 (2000) (quoting Souter, J., dissenting). 
 13. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (finding state aid to religious schools creates excessive 
government entanglement in violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 14. Id. at 622.  
 15. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools after Lee v. Weisman: Lemon is 
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. 795, 804-05 (1993). 
 16. 456 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1982).  
 17. Id. at 244.  
 18. 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983). 
 19. Id. 
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Establishment Clause case law.20 Like Larson and Marsh, Lynch v. 
Donnelly shoved the Lemon Test aside, and instead focused on whether 
the statute endorsed a particular religion.21 While the majority in Lynch 
chose not to use the Lemon Test, the undertones of Lemon's shift from 
separationism to the effects of the statute appeared to be at play. Gaining 
momentum from Lemon's nudge, Lynch and Marsh illustrate the Court's 
self-conscious push from separationist to the effect of the statute on the 
community it governs.22  
The exception carved out in Marsh caused much confusion for the 
Supreme Court Justices in the 1989 case, Allegheny County v. ACLU.23 
In the dictum of Allegheny, the Justices disagreed about Marsh’s 
application beyond legislative prayer, as well as whether the prayers 
must be non-sectarian.24 Without guidance as to Marsh's scope, the 
Supreme Court fell back onto Lynch's use of the endorsement test: if the 
statute is "sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the 
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents 
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices," then the statute 
will be in violation of the Establishment Clause.25 
The Supreme Court reexamined on the Lemon Test in McCreary 
County v. ACLU.26 The majority interpreted the first prong of the Lemon 
Test to necessitate a neutrality principle, in which the secular purpose of 
the statute must predominate over any other purpose.27 The majority 
held that the evaluation of this predominance is by an objective 
observer, while Justice O’Connor suggests the evaluation be based on 
whether a reasonable observer would view an unmistakable message of 
endorsement by the government.28 By this point, the Supreme Court 
completely replaced separationism with nonendorsement and 
neutrality.29 Most of the Justices lie in the ideological camp where the 
state may have substantial involvement in religious aid and religious 
 
 20. Lupu, supra note 7, at 230-33. 
 21. 465 U.S. 668, 678-82 (1984). 
 22. Lupu, supra note 7, at 239-40. 
 23. 492 U.S. 573, 602-10 (1989).  
 24. Id. (writing for the majority in Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy answers the disagreements 
highlighted in Allegheny over Marsh’s scope and holds that nonsectarian prayer is not dispositive in 
legislative prayer cases). 
 25. Id. at 597 (discussing the religious symbol of the creche, the majority believed “regardless of 
history, government may not demonstrate a preference for a particular faith,” and therefore found the 
creche displayed on the steps of a courthouse to be unconstitutional. Id. at 605). 
 26. 545 U.S. 844, 859-60 (2005).                   
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 862, 883-84 (writing a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test first materializes and appears to be adopted by the majority in Allegheny. 465 U.S. at 
688). 
 29. Lupu, supra note 7, at 240. 
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symbols, as long as the effect on the community does not appear to be 
endorsing a particular religion.  
3. The Coercion and Accommodation Age: The Death of Separationism 
In 1992, the Supreme Court took one step further towards 
conservatism through the creation of the coercion test. Justice Kennedy 
created the coercion test in Lee v. Weisman to distinguish legislative 
prayer in Marsh from public school prayer.30 Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that the coercion or social pressure a student might feel 
from the government to support or to participate in religion during a 
student’s graduation ceremony is very different than an adult’s position 
during a state legislature opening prayer session where that adult may 
easily enter and leave for a myriad of reasons.31 The coercion test was 
re-applied in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe to invalidate a 
pre-game prayer practice led by students before high school football 
games.32  
Similar to the neutrality and endorsement tests, the coercion test 
allows the state to have substantial involvement in religious aid and 
symbols. However, the ideological undertones of the coercion test 
moved the focus further from separationists (even more than the 
neutrality and endorsement view) to the effect of the state's message on 
the individual within the community, in order to accommodate the 
individual's conscience.33  Therefore, under the coercion and 
accommodation ideology, the state may have substantial involvement in 
religious aid and religious symbols, as long as the state's involvement is 
not putting pressure on the individual. What that "pressure" looks like is 
up for debate.34 Justice Kennedy believes the pressure or coercion can 
be from society itself, while Justice Thomas suggests it can only be of a 
legal nature.35 Like most Establishment Clause tests, the use of the 
coercion test has been inconsistent. In fact, this coercion test leads to a 
plurality opinion in Town of Greece.36  
The Supreme Court has slowly transitioned from a strict separationist 
 
 30. 505 U.S. 577, 592-94 (1992).                  
 31. Id. at 596-97. 
 32. 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (arguing that the policy of students partaking in an election on 
whether to keep the pre-game prayer encouraged divisiveness along religious lines in a public school 
setting).               
 33. Lupu, supra note 7, at 241. 
 34. See generally Ronald C. Kahn, Religion and the Public Schools after Lee v. Weisman: God 
Save Us from the Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking, Polity Principles, and Religious 
Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES. 983 (1993). 
 35. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93; see Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1838 (2014). 
 36. 134 S. Ct. at 1814. 
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view of the relationship between the state and religion to a more flexible 
view of the relationship between the individual and state.37 
Distinguishing the three ideological camps of the Justices over the 
decades allows for a better understanding of the various tests: the 
Lemon Test, the coercion test, the endorsement test, and Marsh’s 
historical test. The disagreement over which test to apply is exposed in 
Marsh and Town of Greece’s majority, dissenting, and concurring 
opinions.38  
B. Marsh and Town of Greece: Setting the Doctrinal Starting Point 
This article focuses on the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer in 
light of the Establishment Clause. The lower courts only have two 
Supreme Court cases to lead them through the complex and fact-specific 
path: Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway.39 However, 
neither of these cases are concerned specifically with legislator-led or 
lawmaker-led prayer. Yet Marsh and Town of Greece provide the 
foundation from which both the Fourth Circuit and Sixth Circuit begin 
their analyses.  
The first case that dealt with prayer in a legislative context was 
Marsh.40 In Marsh, the Court held that legislative prayer can be 
constitutional in light of historical and traditional practices, as long as 
the legislative prayers do not proselytize or advance a specific religion 
or disparage another.41  Thirty years later, the Court reaffirmed Marsh’s 
holding in Town of Greece that sectarian prayer is not per se 
unconstitutional.42 Following the history and traditions analysis in 
Marsh, the Supreme Court in Town of Greece held that the 
Establishment Clause does not require legislative prayer to be 
nonsectarian or ecumenical.43 Moreover, the Court determined that 
generally, “a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not 
likely establish a constitutional violation.”44 
Marsh involved the Nebraska legislators’ routine of opening their 
meetings with a chaplain-led prayer.45 While a new chaplain could be 
selected every two years, this particular chaplain had been leading the 
 
 37. Lupu, supra note 7, at 250. 
 38. See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1811. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 463 U.S. at 794-95. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1820 (2014). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1824. 
 45. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1983). 
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prayers for sixteen years and had been paid with public funds.46 The 
Court in Marsh momentarily reflected on the test outlined in Lemon, 
before setting Marsh into its own distinct category involving legislative 
prayer.47 Because legislative prayer is “embedded in the history and 
tradition of this country,” the Court held the Nebraska legislative prayer 
practice must be evaluated in light of the historical and traditional 
legislative prayer practices our country has engaged in since its 
founding.48 The Court weighed heavily on the fact that the same 
Congress that established the language of the First Amendment, just 
three days earlier, had authorized the appointment and payment of 
chaplains to open its legislative sessions with prayer.49 A legislature’s 
wish to “invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with 
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of 
religion or a step toward establishment.”50 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
held that, in light of historical and traditionally tolerated legislative 
prayer practices, the Establishment Clause was not violated in this 
case.51  
Town of Greece expounded on Marsh’s holding, yet added its own 
confusing dicta to the Establishment Clause analysis.52 Unlike the 
situation in Marsh, the town of Greece invited local clergy, as unpaid 
volunteers, to open its monthly meeting in prayer.53 The clergy were 
predominantly Christian due to the fact that most local congregations 
were Christian.54 However, the town did not exclude or deny volunteers 
an opportunity to give a prayer.55 Two residents who attended the 
monthly board meetings brought a complaint to the board about the 
prayers being predominantly Christian in content.56 In direct response to 
the complaints, the town invited a Jewish layman, a chairman of a local 
Baha’i temple, and a Wiccan priestess to offer invocations before the 
monthly meetings.57  
The two residents, Galloway and Stephens, brought a suit against the 
town, alleging that the town’s opening prayers did not fall within the 
historical and traditional practices outlined in Marsh because of the 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 786-87. 
 48. Id. at 786. 
 49. Id. at 788. 
 50. Id. at 792.  
 51. Id. at 793-95. 
 52. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818-20 (2014). 
 53. Id. at 1816. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1817. 
 57. Id. 
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sectarian language or messages in the prayers and because of the social 
pressures the town meetings created.58 In order to rectify these alleged 
Establishment Clause violations, Galloway and Stephens sought “an 
injunction that would limit the town to ‘inclusive and ecumenical’ 
prayers that referred only to a ‘generic God’ and would not associate the 
government with any one faith or belief.”59 
The Supreme Court rejected Galloway and Stephen’s arguments that 
the town’s prayers must be nonsectarian. Justice Kennedy, writing for 
the majority, clarified Marsh’s history and traditions test.60 The Court’s 
analysis should not be based on whether a generic God or theism is 
central to the prayers, but on whether “our history and tradition have 
shown that prayer in this limited context could ‘coexis[t] with the 
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.’”61 Justice 
Kennedy held the neutrality element that Galloway and Stephens 
requested was not consistent with Marsh, but was derived from dicta 
from other Establishment Clause cases not addressing legislative 
prayer.62 In fact, the Court stated that a neutrality requirement in 
legislative prayer would expand the governments’ and courts’ 
involvement in religious matters to a worse degree than the situation at 
hand.63  
Yet, this does not mean that legislative prayer does not have 
constraints on its content. If the prayers deviate from their intended use 
— “to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect values long part of the 
Nation’s heritage”— then a different outcome might emerge.64 
However, in town of Greece’s situation, the town made reasonable 
efforts to reach beyond its major congregations to bring diversity to the 
invocations.65 Therefore, the majority appeared to require the courts to 
look beyond the prayers content, to the intentions and motivations 
behind the prayer-giver before prayers amount to an Establishment 
violation.66 
While the first half of Justice Kennedy’s opinion sheds light on 
Marsh’s “history and tradition” analysis, the second half of the opinion 
muddies the Establishment Clause waters as only two other Justices join 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1818. 
 61. Id. at 1820. 
 62. Id. at 1821; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-603 (1989). 
 63. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014). 
 64. Id. at 1823. 
 65. Id. at 1824.  
 66. Id.; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Intentional Discrimination in Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence, 67 ALA. L. REV. 299, 301 (2015). 
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this part of his opinion.67 Drawing on past cases, Justice Kennedy 
pointed to both Allegheny and Van Orden to illustrate the fundamental 
principle in First Amendment cases that the government not coerce its 
citizens “to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”68 
However, the plurality opinion found no such coercion in this case.69 
The plurality opinion directed attention to the fact-sensitive aspects of 
the case: the setting where the prayer is given and the audience present. 
Due to the historical and traditional nature of legislative prayer, “[i]t is 
presumed that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this tradition 
and understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public 
proceedings….”70 Nothing in the record about the setting of the town of 
Greece’s prayers compromises this presumption to the reasonable 
observer.71 Similar to Marsh, the audience is not the public, but the 
present lawmakers who exercise an “internal act” directed to their “own 
members” during legislative prayer in order to implore the divine, not to 
promote one religion above another.72 
While Justice Kennedy’s three-justice plurality opinion stated that in 
this case there was no coercion, he cautioned that the analysis would be 
different if (1) “town board members directed the public to participate in 
the prayers” (2) “town leaders allocated benefits and burdens based on 
participation in the prayer,” or (3) "town leaders signal disfavor toward 
nonparticipants or suggest that their stature in the community was in any 
way diminished.”73 Justice Thomas’s two-justice concurring opinion 
emphasized the coercion must be of a legal nature, not just societal 
pressures.74 Neither Galloway’s nor Stephen’s offense, or feelings of 
disrespect, equal coercion from the town. Unlike the situations in Lee or 
Santa Fe Independent School District, the citizens were not hindered 
from arriving later in the meetings after the prayers, leaving during the 
prayers, or speaking to the town leaders about more diverse prayers.75 
 
 67. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014). 
 68. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. at 677, 683 
(2005) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that our “institutions must not press religious observances upon 
their citizens” Id.). 
 69. Id. at 1825. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1826. 
 74. Id. at 1837-38. 
 75. Id. at 1827; see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290 (2000). 
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C. Lund and Bormuth: The Circuit split on Legislator-Led Prayer 
The biggest factor that distinguishes Lund v. Rowan City and 
Bormuth v. County of Jackson from Marsh and Town of Greece is the 
identity of the prayer-giver. Marsh and Town of Greece do not touch 
much on prayer specifically led by legislatures or public officials 
themselves. Yet Town of Greece prompts courts to conduct a “fact-
sensitive” review of the particular prayer practice when the historical 
principles established by the Supreme Court do not direct a specific 
result.76  Therefore, both the Fourth and Sixth Circuit begin their “fact-
sensitive” analysis from Marsh and Town of Greece’s “doctrinal starting 
point.”77  
1. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lund 
Unlike Marsh and Town of Greece, the prayer-givers in Lund were 
the Commissioners themselves.78 There were five members of the Board 
of Commissioners who met twice a month to hold board meetings in 
front of community members.79 During these meetings, one of the five 
commissioners led a prayer of his or her choosing.80 The prayer-giver 
usually asked everyone to stand up, bow their heads, and join in 
prayer.81 Over the last five years, ninety-seven percent of the 
commissioners’ prayers referenced “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Savior,” along 
with other Christian content.82 Some board meeting prayers requested 
forgiveness on behalf of the whole community and other prayers 
requested attendees to accept Christianity.83 After the prayers, the 
meetings continued with the Pledge of Allegiance, a public comment 
time, and an addressment of the matters on the agenda for the evening.84 
When both complaints were made about the prayers and the ACLU of 
North Carolina notified the board about their potential Establishment 
 
 76. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 77. Lund v. Rowan City., N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 78. Id. at 272. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 273. 
 81. Id. at 272. 
 82. Id. at 273.; see, e.g., S.A. 14 (prayer of April 21, 2008) ("I ask all these things in the name of 
Jesus, the King of Kings and the Lord of Lords. Amen."). 
 83. Lund, 863 F.3d at 273.; see, e.g., S.A. 30 (prayer of August 1, 2011) ("Lord, we confess that 
we have not loved you with all our heart, and mind and strength, and that we have not loved one another 
as Christ loves us. We have also neglected to follow the guidance of your Holy Spirit, and have allowed 
sin to enter into our lives."); see also, e.g., S.A. 21 (prayer of October 5, 2009) ("Father, I pray that all 
may be one as you, Father, are in Jesus, and He in you. I pray that they may be one in you, that the 
world may believe that you sent Jesus to save us from our sins."). 
 84. Lund, 863 F.3d at 272. 
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Clause violation, individual commissioners stated they would continue 
to start the board meetings with prayer for the benefit of the Rowan 
community.85 The prayers became so controversial that they appeared in 
the platforms of two incumbents in the 2016 board elections.86  
The Fourth Circuit begins its analysis of Lund by distinguishing it 
from Marsh and Town of Greece in two ways. The most obvious being 
that in both Marsh and Town of Greece the prayer-givers were guest 
clergy or ministers, while in Lund the prayer-givers were the legislators 
themselves.87 Because the prayer opportunities were reserved only for 
the legislators, the Fourth Circuit believed that the commissioners 
created a “closed universe” of prayer-givers.88 While these facts alone 
might not be outcome-determinative, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
“combination of legislators as the sole prayer-givers, official invitation 
for audience participation, consistently sectarian prayers referencing but 
a single faith, and the intimacy of a local government setting” go beyond 
the historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer.89 Therefore, 
the Fourth Circuit held that under a “fact-sensitive” constitutional 
inquiry, Rowan City’s prayer practices, taken as a whole, exceeded the 
constitutional limits established in Marsh and Town of Greece.90  
Beginning similarly to Marsh and Town of Greece, the Fourth Circuit 
reflected on the past historical and traditional practices of prayer led by 
the legislators or public officials themselves.91 The Circuit cited 
multiple instances when legislators or public officials have led prayer. 
However, the Circuit found this to be the exception. Most instances 
illustrate legislators leading prayer as an occasional practice to the more 
consistent practice of chaplains leading the prayer.92 For example, 
Congress gives Senators, from time to time, the opportunity to deliver 
the prayer.93 However, more often, Congress invites guest ministers and 
clergy to deliver the prayers or invocations.94 Here, for the Fourth 
Circuit, lies the threat to the Establishment Clause: Rowan City does not 
extend the opportunity to lead prayer to the lawmakers, but instead 
reserves the opportunity to lead the prayer exclusively for the 
lawmakers.95  
 
 85. Id. at 273. 
 86. Id. at 282. 
 87. Id. at 277. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 275. 
 90. Id. at 280. 
 91. Id. at 279. 
 92. Id.   
 93. Id.   
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.   
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Importantly, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that not all legislator-led 
prayer is “inherently unconstitutional.”96 Instead, the Court wished to 
establish that the identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the “fact-
sensitive” constitutional inquiry in Establishment Clause cases.97 Due to 
the identity of the prayer-givers as legislators, Rowan City not only set 
an exhaustive list of prayer-givers, but created an environment in which 
the prayers were composed and tailored to the sectarian beliefs each 
commissioner held.98 In this case, the single faith represented by the 
commissioners in their prayers was Christianity.99  The Fourth Circuit 
found the prayer-giver restriction to be in direct contrast with Marsh and 
Town of Greece. The ability of lawmakers to invite ministers and clergy, 
the Fourth Circuit believes, allows the legislators to accommodate 
diverse religions. Instead, Rowan restricted prayer practice creating an 
intolerant and “closed universe” that the Fourth Circuit viewed as an 
advancement of a single faith.100 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit viewed Rowan’s exclusive prayer 
practice as posing a risk to the political process within the city. Indeed, 
the Fourth Circuit believed the risk of political division had already 
begun. During one meeting, the individual who initially complained 
about the prayers was openly mocked.101 In addition, the prayers became 
a campaign issue in the most recent board elections.102 The court 
reflected on the Supreme Court’s warning in Lemon that “political 
division along religious lines…is a threat to the normal political 
process,” and is “one of the principal evils against which the First 
Amendment was intended to protect.”103  
The Fourth Circuit insisted that due to the Rowan City’s exclusive 
prayer practice, it has “link[ed] itself persistently and relentlessly to a 
single faith.”104 One religion cannot be officially preferred over another. 
The Fourth Circuit suggested that the “reasonable observer” familiar 
with the history and tradition of legislative prayer would easily view this 
preference of Christianity through the sectarian prayers that sometimes 
invited observers to embrace Christianity as the sole road to salvation.105  
Citing Town of Greece, the Fourth Circuit assigned importance to the 
fact that the “town board members directed the public to participate in 
 
 96. Id. at 280. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 282. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 283 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)). 
 105. Id. at 284-87. 
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the prayers” as potentially dispositive of Rowan’s prayer practice 
exceeding the constitutional limits of legislative prayer.106 
Last, the Fourth Circuit entertained Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
suggestion in Town of Greece to consider “the setting in which the 
prayer arises.”107 Because the prayers were delivered at public meetings 
which are led by a local government body, the “close proximity” 
between the legislator-led prayers and the deliberation of certain 
individual community members’ appeals made the court very 
uncomfortable.108 The Fourth Circuit feared this “close proximity” 
provided an avenue for abuse by the commissioners to deliberate issues 
not on the merits of the petition, but on whether the individual joined in 
the prayers.109  
2. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bormuth 
The prayers in Bormuth were extremely similar to the prayers 
complained about in Lund, yet the Sixth Circuit came out opposite of the 
Fourth Circuit.110 Exactly like Lund, the prayer-givers in Bormuth were 
one of the nine individuals on the Jackson County Board of 
Commissioners.111 The meetings began with the boards’ chairman 
asking attendees to stand and bow their heads and proceed with one of 
the commissioners leading the prayer.112 Similar to Lund, the Pledge of 
Allegiance was offered after the prayer and then the board conducted its 
usual business.113 The prayer contents tended to be Christian.114 
However, the prayer was on a rotating basis between the nine 
commissioners, who have the freedom to lead the invocation however 
they please.115  
The plaintiff first complained of the prayers during an open comment 
period of the meeting.116 During his complaint, one of the 
commissioners turned his chair so that his back faced the plaintiff, 
 
 106. Id. at 287 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014)) (emphasis 
added by the Fourth Circuit). 
 107. Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825). 
 108. Id. at 288. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc opinion). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. For example, “[s]ome prayers ask for blessings for others, from county residents suffering 
particular hardships, to military members, first responders serving in Jackson County, and others.” Id.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 499.  
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which the plaintiff stated offended and insulted him.117 The plaintiff 
feared that due to his complaint, the board would now discriminate 
against him during the County’s dealings.118 After his complaint, the 
plaintiff brought a suit against the County.119 Not long after his 
commencement of litigation, the plaintiff desired appointment to the 
County’s new Solid Waste Planning Committee.120 However, he did not 
receive a nomination from the board to the committee and later amended 
his complaint against the County to reflect this alleged prejudice against 
him.121 
The Sixth Circuit first addressed a procedural issue that is worth 
noting.122 The factual recitation before the Sixth Circuit does not include 
comments made, and recorded in videos, by the commissioners before 
and after litigation commenced.123 Since no video evidence of these 
public recordings of the board of commissioners' meetings were 
presented to the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held it "will not 
entertain on appeal factual recitations not presented to the district court 
when reviewing a district court's decision."124 These videos, highlighted 
in Americans United for Separation of Church and State's amicus brief, 
included recordings of  board meetings over a two year span all of 
which began with a prayer lead by one of the commissioners, except for 
the one meeting no citizens were in attendance.125 The video recordings 
also captured comments made by the commissioners in reaction to the 
litigation.126 
Just as the Fourth Circuit in Lund, the Sixth Circuit began its analysis 
with Marsh and Town of Greece as the foundation.127 However, unlike 
the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit found legislator-led prayer to be far 
from an exception to the rule.128 Citing many of the amicus briefs 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.   
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 500 (quoting Chicago Title Ins. Corp v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007)).  
 125. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. United for Separation of Church and State In Support of 
Appellant and Reversal at 10, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F. 3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 126. Id. at 26. For example, one of the commissioners told the Plaintiff: "It's taken some nitwit 
200 and some years to come up with an angle like this to try to deprive me or other people of my faith, 
of my rights." Id. (quoting County of Jackson, Personnel and Finance Committee November 12, 2013 
Jackson County, MI, YouTube (Dec. 19, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/2013nov12 (43:00)). During another 
meeting one commissioner declared the lawsuit was not "just an attack on us, it's an attack on 
Christianity, and it's an attack on our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ." (Id. at 33:28). 
 127. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2017).  
 128. Id. at 509-510.  
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submitted, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated “the historical breadth of 
legislator-led prayer in the state capitals for over one hundred fifty 
years.”129 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the historical breadth to include 
guest ministers or legislator-appointed chaplains, as either prayer-giver 
is consistent with the traditional and modern practice of legislators 
leading prayers.130 In light of the historical and traditional practices, the 
Sixth Circuit viewed legislator-led prayer to be no different than 
legislator-authorized prayer as both instances fill our history and 
traditions.131  
In addition to Jackson County’s prayer practice coinciding with the 
historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer, the Sixth Circuit 
held the prayers within the limits of Town of Greece’s constraints: the 
content of the prayers should not preach conversion, disparage 
minorities, advance a single faith, or “betray an impermissible 
government purpose.”132 While the prayers were predominately 
Christian, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit did not view the 
Commissioners as preferential to one religion over another.133 The Sixth 
Circuit pointed to the County’s prayer policy to illustrate that the 
County permits prayers of all faiths or no faith.134 The commissioners 
elected at that time choose what prayers to compose; the board had no 
influence over the content of the prayers.135 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit 
viewed the religious makeup of the commissioners to be irrelevant and 
immaterial to the legislative prayer analysis. Instead, citing Town of 
Greece, the Sixth Circuit believed that the relevant and material factors 
are the policies dictating the prayers content.136 And therefore, the Sixth 
Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation that “Town of 
Greece’s holding is dependent upon religious heterogeneity,” because it 
believes that Marsh and Town of Greece do not require the board to 
provide opportunities to people of other faiths.137  
 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit found Justice Kennedy’s 
plurality suggestion to consider “the setting in which the prayer arises 
and the audience to whom it is directed” useless as Jackson County’s 
legislative prayer practice does not rise to the level of coercion.138 
 
 129. Id. at 510.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.   
 132. Id. at 512. 
 133. Id. at 513. 
 134. Id. at 514. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 515-16 (explaining that Justice Kennedy’s coercion test was only joined by two other 
Justices and the Sixth Circuit’s panel was divided on whether “Justice Kennedy’s three-Justice plurality 
16
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Similar to Town of Greece, the Sixth Circuit held the coercive effect of 
prayers at board meetings to be no different from the effect of prayers at 
legislative sessions.139 While the Fourth Circuit in Lund determined the 
prayer to be in such a “close proximity” to the deliberation of individual 
community member’s appeals, the Sixth Circuit cited Town of Greece’s 
situation and the majority’s holding as rejecting these distinctions.140 In 
addition, the “reasonable observer” familiar with the history and 
tradition of legislative prayer would not see a preferential treatment of 
one religion over another in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit.141 The Sixth 
Circuit distinguished itself from Lund in this sense. The Sixth Circuit 
recognized that in Lund the Fourth Circuit found excessive examples of 
prayers “portraying non-Christians as ‘spiritual[ly] defect[ive]’ and 
‘suggesting that other faiths are inferior.’”142 However, the Sixth Circuit 
found no instances of harsh criticism against Jackson County’s citizens 
or the plaintiff in this case.143  
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
the commissioners’ request of attendees to rise and bow their heads was 
coercive by showing preferential treatment or mandating 
participation.144 The practice of requesting attendees to join in prayer in 
this case is no different in the eyes of the Sixth Circuit than guest 
ministers requesting in Town of Greece.145 Unlike the Fourth Circuit in 
Lund who found these requests served only to marginalize attendees, the 
Sixth Circuit viewed these requests approved by the majority in Town of 
Greece as “commonplace” and “reflexive” requests that “do not alone 
mandate participation.”146  
In addition, the Sixth Circuit viewed the two commissioners turning 
their backs during plaintiff’s complaints or the board choosing other 
appointments to a board committee littered with other factors and 
 
opinion or Justice Thomas’s two-Justice concurring opinion” controls on the question of coercion. 
However, the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s challenge fails under both standards, and therefore 
need not be resolved at this time). 
 139. Id. at 516. 
 140. Id.; see Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1851-52 (2014) (explaining the 
distinction between a legislative floor session and an intimate town hall meeting, was one of the core 
issues Justice Kagan had with the majority in Town of Greece). 
 141. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2017) (dismissing Justice 
Thomas’s legal coercion test as inapplicable in the case at hand as the plaintiff only claimed societal 
pressures under Justice Kennedy’s Town of Greece opinion) 
 142. Id. at 517-18 (quoting Lund v. Rowan City., N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2017)).  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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incidents regarding the plaintiff.147 The Sixth Circuit determined no 
coercion present as there was no proof that the board acted prejudicially 
against the plaintiff nor “allocated benefits and burdens” based on a 
prejudice for not participating in the prayer.148 Importantly, the Sixth 
Circuit reaffirmed Town of Greece’s holding that “[o]ffense…does not 
equate to coercion,” and therefore, Jackson County did not betray an 
impermissible government principle.149 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Fourth and Sixth Circuit applied the basic law of Marsh and 
Town of Greece correctly. Both circuits agreed that legislator-led prayer 
is not per se unconstitutional, and in certain circumstances may lie 
within the historical and traditional legislative practices of this nation. 
The split between the circuits does not lie in the application of law, but 
in the Sixth Circuit’s mischaracterization of Town of Greece’s proper 
holding. Town of Greece requires courts to look beyond the prayer-
giver’s identity to the intention behind giving the prayer.150 Sectarian 
prayers are within the historical and traditional practices of legislative 
prayer, so long as the prayer opportunity is not used to proselytize or 
advance or disparage a particular faith. Another limitation upon the 
prayer-giver’s intentions or motivations, is the prayers should not be 
used for political divisiveness. These prohibited motivations are 
identified by the Fourth Circuit quickly and are the reasons Rowan’s 
prayer practice fell outside the bounds of historical and traditional 
legislative prayer practices. However, the Sixth Circuit failed to identify 
these obvious motivations, and moreover intentionally dismissed 
evidence that illustrated the commissioners’ misuse of prayer through a 
procedural ruling. 
A. The Basic Law: Legislator-Led Prayer is Not Per Se Unconstitutional 
The Supreme Court in Marsh and Town of Greece consistently held 
that “it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the 
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is 
permitted.”151 Yet, the question the Sixth and Fourth Circuit are 
 
 147. Id. (explaining plaintiff had brought suits against multiple individuals and elected officials 
many times showing the dislike was not based on his religious beliefs, but antagonism towards him as a 
person). 
 148. Id. at 518-19 (arguing that the plaintiff showed no proof to his belief that his rejection from 
two committees was based on his complaint about prayer). 
 149. Id.   
 150. Corbin, supra note 66, at 301. 
 151. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014). 
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confronted with is within this very realm: whether legislator-led prayer 
fits within the historical and traditional practices followed in both 
Congress and state legislatures. While the Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ 
holdings appear contradictory, the essence of the two cases is in perfect 
harmony. Both circuits agree that legislator-led prayer is not per se 
unconstitutional and can be within the historical and traditional 
legislative prayer practices.152 The disagreements ensue between the 
circuits on what weight should be given to the identity of the prayer-
giver in the "fact-sensitive" inquiry required by Town of Greece.153 
However, a closer look illuminates that the circuits only disagree on the 
consequences of potentially inconsistent results. 
The Sixth Circuit believes "legislative prayer [should not be] 
predicated on the identity of the speaker" because this would cause 
inconsistent and ridiculous results.154 For example, if two identical 
prayers were delivered in bordering counties, one prayer given by a 
guest minister and the other by a legislator, the prayer given by the guest 
minister would be held constitutional, while the prayer given by the 
legislator would be struck down.155 The Fourth Circuit does not 
necessarily disagree with the Sixth Circuit's view. The Fourth Circuit 
admits that depending on the circumstances, prayer by legislators in one 
instance may be constitutional and in another may be 
unconstitutional.156 Nevertheless, in the Fourth Circuit's view, this 
inconsistency is aligned with Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In 
some situations sectarian prayer is unconstitutional, and in others 
situations it is constitutional.157 Similar to sectarian prayers, the identity 
of the prayer-giver is one of the relevant factors to consider in the "fact-
sensitive" constitutional inquiry.158 
From the lens of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Town of Greece, the 
Supreme Court would agree with both circuits that legislator-led prayer 
is not inherently unconstitutional and can fall within the historical and 
traditional practices of legislative prayer. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court would likely side with the Fourth Circuit that the identity of the 
prayer-giver, like sectarian prayers, is a relevant factor in the 
constitutional inquiry. But Justice Kennedy would beg the courts to not 
stop the analysis there. The courts must look beyond the prayer-giver’s 
 
 152. Lund v. Rowan City, N.C., 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2017); Bormuth v. County of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 509 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 153. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825. 
 154. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Lund, 863 F.3d at 280. 
 157. Id.   
 158. Id. 
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identity and evaluate the intentions and motivations of the prayer-giver 
for leading the invocations. Recall Justice Kennedy's reference to 
prohibited motivations in Town of Greece: "[a]bsent a pattern of prayers 
that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible 
government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of prayer 
will not likely establish a constitutional violation."159 Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy's reference suggests the importance of the prayer-givers 
motivation behind giving the prayer. Is the prayer for the legislators to 
call upon divine guidance or is the prayer to proselytize, to advance a 
particular faith, or disparage another religion? 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Strategy: A Procedural Sidestep Around Town of 
Greece’s True Holding 
Both circuits apply the general law of Marsh and Town of Greece 
correctly. Beginning with Marsh and Town of Greece's traditional and 
historical practice analysis, the circuits determine legislator-led prayer is 
not per se unconstitutional and, in some instances, falls within the 
historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer. However, 
legislator-led prayer has its limitations. Justice Kennedy emphasized in 
Town of Greece that if the prayers proselytize, disparage a faith, 
advance a particular faith, or betray an impermissible governmental 
purpose, the prayer practice will fall outside the historical and traditional 
legislative prayer practices of this nation.160 These limitations direct the 
court's attention to the motivation behind the prayer-giver's invocations. 
Once the motivation transforms from a practice to lend divine guidance 
to an opportunity to proselytize, disparage, or advance a particular 
religion, the legislative prayer is in direct conflict with the 
Establishment Clause. 
The discordance between the holdings of Lund and Bormuth lies 
within the Sixth Circuit's mischaracterization of Town of Greece's true 
holding: the purpose of prayer is to "lend gravity to the occasion and 
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage,” as well as to "invoke 
divine guidance in town affairs."161 Legislative prayer should not be 
used to proselytize or disparage, or advance, one faith over another. 
There is also a third purpose prayer should not be used for, political 
divineness. The Supreme Court must heed Lemon's long ago warning 
that political division along religious lines is a threat to the normal 
political process, and thus the prayers should not be used as a political 
wedge. Political divisiveness is an impermissible government purpose. 
 
 159. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1823. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1816, 1823. 
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Therefore, if there is a motive behind the prayer-givers to create a 
political community around religious divisions, then it would be outside 
the historical and traditional practices of legislative prayer and forbidden 
by the Establishment Clause. 
The Sixth Circuit failed to understand that Town of Greece requires 
the courts to go beyond the identity of the prayer-giver. Courts must 
evaluate the prayer-giver's motive behind giving the invocation and 
determine whether the prayer practice crosses the "line between 
permissible and impermissible legislative prayer."162 The Fourth Circuit, 
on the other hand, correctly identified the commissioners’ motives 
behind the prayer practice. Not only were the prayers used to proselytize 
and advance one religion over another, but the prayers were used to 
cause divide within the community.163 At one particular meeting, an 
individual who opposed the prayer practice was booed and mocked by 
the audience.164 Moreover, the prayer practice was used as a campaign 
platform by incumbents and challengers.165 This kind of conduct is 
exactly what the majority in Lemon and Justice Breyer's concurring 
opinion in Van Orden warned against.166  
The Sixth Circuit majority strategically and intentionally ignored 
Town of Greece's core principle and did not look beyond the prayer-
giver's identity to the motive of the prayer-giver. This strategic move 
was not in the substance of the opinion, but within the procedural 
history of the case. As stated above, the Sixth Circuit refused to 
supplement the appellant record with facts preserved in video recordings 
of the board commissioners’ meetings or take judicial notice of the 
videos. This procedural note is vital because the videos contain strong 
evidence that the board members’ motivations for giving the prayers 
were outside the scope of Marsh and Town of Greece. The reason for 
this is twofold. First, the Sixth Circuit held that under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(c), Bormuth had “an affirmative duty to direct the 
court’s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it 
seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact,” and it failed to 
do so.167 Second, the Sixth Circuit declined to take judicial notice of the 
videos because of an apparent tension between judicial notice and the 
need “to review the case presented to the district court, rather than a 
 
 162. Lund, 863 F.3d at 295. 
 163. Id. at 282-85. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971). Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 
(2005). 
 167. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Chicago 
Title Ins. Corp v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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better case fashioned after a district court’s unfavorable order.”168 
Regarding the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Sixth 
Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to assist the district court in 
understanding the facts within the videos.169 The Sixth Court pointed to 
the party’s briefs, as well as the plaintiff’s complaint, to emphasize the 
lack of presentation of any video evidence.170 However, the counsel for 
the County even admitted, during oral arguments at the panel stage of 
this case, that the official record includes all of the videos of the board 
of commissioners’ meetings.171 Further, the plaintiff referenced the 
videos in his amended complaint and the Plaintiff’s Response to 
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.172 Nevertheless, the Sixth 
Circuit majority determined the plaintiff waived its opportunity to bring 
the district court’s attention to those facts, and accordingly the Sixth 
Circuit would not supplement the appellate record with these videos 
either. 
The Sixth Circuit also declined to take judicial notice of the videos. 
While the Sixth Circuit may take judicial notice at any stage of the 
proceeding under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Sixth Circuit 
refused to do so based on a desire to avoid potential tension between 
district and appellate courts.173 Yet this disregards the language of the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c): “[t]he court . . . must take judicial 
notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary 
information.”174 The kinds of facts include facts that are not subject to 
reasonable dispute.175 The facts within the videos were not subject to 
reasonable dispute, as the majority even pointed out, because Jackson 
County admitted the accuracy of these publicly-available videos.176 
Moreover, there was not a present tension in this case between the 
district and appellate courts, as the dissent correctly pointed out, because 
the plaintiff directed the district court’s attention to the facts within 
these videos in his amended complaint and in his Plaintiff’s Response to 
the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.177 
 
 168. Id. at 501. 
 169. Id. at 499-500.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (requiring certain procedures for parties asserting 
there is a genuinely disputed fact).  
 170. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 500. 
 171. Id. at 530-31. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 501. 
 174. Fed. R Evid. 201. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 501. 
 177. Id. at 531. 
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C. The Missing Videos: A Look Beyond the Prayer-Giver’s Identity 
Within these video recordings was strong evidence that the board 
members’ motivations for giving the prayers were not limited to calling 
on divine guidance, but were also used to proselytize, advance one 
religion over another, and create political divineness. For example, one 
video uncovered that one of the boards’ commissioners prayed at every 
meeting during a two year span, except for one meeting when no 
citizens attended.178 Another video revealed the board of commissioners 
exclusively giving the prayers at every meeting because they were 
worried about "certain people com[ing] up here and say[ing] things that 
they are not going to like."179 The board of commissioners wanted to 
avoid "things that they [were] not going to like" and did not want to 
"open a Pandora's Box" by allowing others to pray.180 These videos 
exposed a pattern and underlying motive that the prayers led by the 
commissioners were not intended for themselves, but were intended for 
the citizens attending the meetings. The intention was to proselytize and 
advance Christianity specifically, because Christian prayers were the 
kinds of prayers they liked. 
Further, the videos contradict the Sixth Circuit's argument that the 
comments made by the commissioners were not directed at the plaintiff's 
beliefs. One video reveals a commissioner calling the plaintiff a 
"nitwit": "[i]t's taken some nitwit 200 and some years to come up with 
an angle like this to try to deprive me or other people of my faith, of my 
rights."181 Another video shows a commissioner characterizing this issue 
as "political correctness nonsense" and stated the plaintiff has "political 
correctness jammed down his throat."182 An event the Sixth Circuit did 
take into consideration was when one commissioner turned his back to 
the plaintiff when the plaintiff first expressed his objection to the 
boards’ prayer practice. The Sixth Circuit brushed this aside, stating it 
was not in reaction to the plaintiff's views, but to him bringing a lawsuit. 
However, the commissioner turned his back when the plaintiff first 
expressed his view about the prayer practice. Both the rhetoric in these 
videos and the commissioners’ conduct demonstrate that the 
commissioners were specifically distained by and wished to exclude the 
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plaintiff's minority beliefs.  
The Sixth Circuit attempted to distinguish itself from the Fourth 
Circuit at this point; suggesting the Fourth Circuit in Lund had multiple 
examples of opprobrium.183 Yet all of the above examples illustrate the 
commissioners’ defamation against the plaintiff, before and after 
litigation commenced, because of his minority view about the prayer 
practice. While the Sixth  Circuit wished to conceal the videos from the 
record, there were still incidents the Sixth Circuit took into 
consideration that point to the true motivation behind the 
commissioners’ prayer practice. Two commissioners were reported in a 
local newspaper stating "[Bormuth] is attacking us and, from my 
perspective, my Lord and savior Jesus Christ. Our civil liberties should 
not be taken away from us, as commissioners" and "[w]hat about my 
rights?... If a guy doesn't want to hear a public prayer, he can come into 
the meeting two minutes late."184 The Sixth Circuit viewed them as just 
expressions about the commissioners’ right to offer prayer. Nonetheless, 
even if the commissioners’ were only speaking about their rights, the 
fact that the statements were published in the local newspaper and 
people in the community knew who the plaintiff was, clearly caused a 
community controversy and political division along religious lines. 
Members of the community now are either for or against the legislative 
prayer practice. Members are either an insider or an outsider.  
Based on the facts within and outside of the appellate record, the 
Jackson County Board of Commissioners clearly intended the prayers to 
be a means to proselytize, advance Christianity, and create political 
divisions within the community. The Sixth Circuit’s attempt to bury the 
facts in a pile of procedural rulings does not change the obvious 
motivations behind the legislator-led prayer. Unlike the Fourth Circuit, 
the Sixth refused to follow Town of Greece’s requirement to look 
beyond the prayers to the intentions of the prayer-giver. If Bormuth is 
granted cert to the Supreme Court, the case will almost certainly be 
found to be a mischaracterization of Town of Greece and flagrant 
attempt to ignore facts relevant to the “fact-sensitive” inquiry. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is, and will continue to be, an 
ongoing debate between courts. As justices transition in and out of the 
Supreme Court, there is no doubt the ideology behind the Establishment 
Clause will continue to shift. Nonetheless, during the current time, the 
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Establishment Clause holds, at least in regards to legislative prayer, the 
“fact-sensitive” inquiry must begin and end with a look behind the 
prayers content and the prayer-giver’s identity to the motivations and 
intentions of the prayer-giver or prayer policy. Marsh and Town of 
Greece require courts to evaluate the intentions in light of the historical 
and traditional practices of legislative prayer. And if the intentions for 
the prayers consist of proselytizing, advancing, or disparaging a 
particular religion or causing political divisiveness, then the Supreme 
Court will find the prayer practice outside of the historical and 
traditional legislative prayer practices of our nation.  
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